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 CHAPTER 7 : THE COPYRIGHT/DESIGN INTERFACE IN AUSTRALIA 
 
Chronological table of legislation and statistics 
Period 
 
 
  
Legislation Amendments  Interpretation (ie by 
courts) 
Further information  Design 
applications 
Design 
registrations 
1. 1852 
- 1906 
Copyright 
Act 1869 
(Vic) 
Copyright 
Act 1878 
(SA) 
Copyright 
Act 1879 
(NSW) 
Patents, 
Designs and 
Trade Marks 
Act 1884 
(Qld) 
Designs and 
Trade Marks 
Act 1884 
(WA) 
Patents, 
Designs and 
Trade Marks 
Act 1893 
(Tas) 
Exhibitors 
Protection Act 
1872 (Vic) 
Designs and 
Trade Marks 
1884 and Patent 
Act Amendment 
Act 1886 (WA) 
Copyright Act 
1890 (Vic) 
Cumulation  (Vic, 
NSW, SA, QLD) 
Partial demarcation 
(WA & Tas) – excluded 
sculptures 
 
 
Some early colonial 
legislation dealt with 
designs and patents 
for inventions in the 
same acts: 
Letters of Registration 
for Inventions Act 
1852 (NSW) 
Patent Act 1859 (SA) 
 
No data No data 
2. 1907 
- 1912 
Copyright 
Act 1905 
(Cth) 
Design Act 
1906 (Cth) 
 Cumulation?  WIPO 1151 (192)
  
WIPO 988 (165) 
3. 
1913-
1968 
Copyright 
Act 1912 
(Cth) 
Design Act 
1906 (Cth) 
 Demarcation, no 
copyright protection 
for acts within scope 
of design protection. 
 
 WIPO 51936 
(944)*  
WIPO 42459 
(772)* 
4. 
1969-
1980 
Copyright 
Act 1968 
(Cth) 
Design Act 
1906 
Designs Act 
1968 (Cth) 
Design 
Regulations 
1969 (Cth) 
 
As above, period 3  WIPO 29294 
(2441) 
IP Australia (1972 
– 1980) 6936 
(771)** 
WIPO 21239 
(1770) 
IP Australia 
(1972 – 1980) 
3156 (351)** 
5. 
1981-
1989 
Copyright 
Act 1968 
(Cth) 
Designs Act 
1906 (Cth) 
Designs 
Amendment Act 
1981 (Cth) 
 
As above, period 3  WIPO 35401 
(3933) 
 
IP Australia 28394 
(3155) 
WIPO 24337 
(2704) 
 
 
IP Australia 
21531 (2392) 
6. 1990 
- 2003 
Copyright 
Act 1968 
(Cth) 
Designs Act 
1906 (Cth 
Copyright 
Amendment Act 
1989 (Cth) 
Partial cumulation for 
2 dimensional artistic 
works, demarcation 
for 3 dimensional 
works applied 
industrially, 
demarcation for works 
of artistic 
craftsmanship, 
buildings and models 
of buildings (copyright 
protection unless 
register a design) 
 WIPO 58575 
(4184) 
 
 
IP Australia 58645 
(4189) 
WIPO 47804 
(3415) 
 
 
 
IP Australia 
47801 (3414) 
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7. 2004 
- 2015 
 
Copyright 
Act 1968 
(Cth) 
Design Act 
2003  
 
Designs 
(Consequential 
Amendments) 
Act (2002) 
As above, period 6 Definition of ‘building 
or model of building’ 
altered so as not to 
include portable 
buildings, pre-
constructed swimming 
pools and 
demountable 
buildings.  
WIPO (to 2014) 
66236 (6021)  
IP Australia (to 
2015) 73496 
(6125) 
WIPO (to 2014) 
64085 (5826)   
IP Australia (to 
2015) 70639 
(5887) 
*No data for 1941. 
** The huge discrepancy between data from WIPO and data from IP Australia in the period prior to 1981 must raise serious doubts as to 
the accuracy of the data in this period. IP Australia suggests that the WIPO data is more likely to be accurate (personal communication 
with author). 
Introduction 
The law relating to designs in Australia has long been the subject of dissatisfaction. As long ago as 
1936, Sir Owen Dixon referred to the Designs Act 1906 as ‘rather peculiar’1, while the interface 
between copyright and designs has garnered even more pointed criticism, being called ‘troubled’2, 
‘vexed’3 and an area of ‘(perennial) confusion’.4 At different times Australia has adopted different 
approaches to the overlap, moving from potential cumulation (or dual protection as it is more 
commonly known in Australia) to demarcation and then to partial cumulation (for two-dimensional 
works) combined with demarcation (for three-dimensional works). Legislative implementation of 
these policies, however, has been far from straightforward. At each stage, Australia looked to the 
United Kingdom to inform its legislative approach. While never simply slavishly copying the UK’s 
legislative language, the tendency was at first to follow generally where the UK led. From 1968, 
however, the position of the two countries diverged, with Australia pursuing a stricter approach of 
demarcation until it adopted partial cumulation in 1989. Moreover, while the UK simplified its 
legislative provisions, Australia’s approach was to add further detail – an approach that has not 
necessarily resulted in greater clarity. 
The first section of this chapter examines the history of designs and the copyright/design interface in 
Australia from 1852 to the present, while the second section briefly looks at some of the ongoing 
problems in this area. Although issues also arise as to the interrelationship between patents and 
designs, and to a lesser extent between trade marks and designs, this chapter does not address 
these in any detail. 
Part A History of the copyright/design interface in Australia 
1. First period 1852 – 1906: Varying approaches in the colonies prior to Federation 
                                                          
* I am grateful to Eloise Chandler and Kosta Hountalas for research assistance and to Jill McKeough and 
Kimberlee Weatherall for reading this chapter in draft. All errors remain my own. 
1
 Macrae Knitting Mills Ltd v. Lowes Ltd (1936) 55 CLR 725, p. 729; (1936) 10 ALJR 201; [1936] HCA 43. 
2
 Jani McCutcheon, ‘Too many stitches in time? The Polo Lauren case, non-infringing accessories and the 
copyright/design overlap defence’ (2009) 20 Australian Intellectual Property Journal 39, 52. 
3
 Sam Ricketson, ‘Towards a Rational Basis for the Protection of Industrial Design in Australia’ (1994) 5 
Australian Intellectual Property Journal 193, 194. 
4
 Advisory Council on Intellectual Property, Review of the Designs System: Options Paper (2014), 30. 
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After many years of comparative neglect, recent years have seen growing levels of academic interest 
in the history of intellectual property in Australia.5 Design rights, however, have not yet seen the 
benefits of this emergent interest and the copyright/design interface still less so.6 This section thus 
briefly sketches the early years of intellectual property laws and the legal background against which 
they developed.  
When the tall ships of the First Fleet arrived in Botany Bay in January 1788, they carried with them 
all English laws applicable to the conditions of the new colony. During the colony’s infant years, few 
if any of the new arrivals – the majority of whom had not travelled there by choice but under Her 
Majesty’s pleasure – would have considered England’s panoply of intellectual property laws 
applicable or relevant to the situation in which they found themselves. However, as the settlement 
expanded, with new arrivals bringing valuable skills both technical and entrepreneurial, 
opportunities for commerce, industry and cultural production began to grow. Governors, and soon 
the Legislative Councils of the two colonies of New South Wales and Van Diemen’s Land, had power 
to pass local laws, as long as they were not ‘repugnant’ to the Laws of England, and in 1828 the 
imperial Parliament enacted the Australian Courts Act 1828 (UK) which stated explicitly that English 
statutes and judicial decisions were operative in New South Wales and Van Diemen’s Land.7 
However, English Acts passed after 1828 were not operative unless they applied by paramount force 
– in other words, stated that they applied to the colony in question.8  
The British statutes relating to copyright, patents and designs thus passed prior to those dates 
formed part of the colonies’ law, and some later statutes were expressed to apply by paramount 
force.9 The colonial legislatures also had the power to enact local laws and this included the ability to 
issue patents by parliamentary act.10 However, it was soon realised that the UK statutes did not 
apply to books published or inventions first made in the colony in question.11 Moreover, the Patent 
Law Amendment Act 1852 (UK) provided patents would not apply automatically to the colonies,12 
and the 1868 decision of Routledge v Low13 confirmed in the field of copyright that books published 
in the colonies would have protection in a colony, and only in that colony, if it had passed a 
copyright statute (which none of them had).14 
                                                          
5
 See the references in Catherine Bond, ‘“Cabined, Cribbed, Confined, Bound In”: Copyright in the Australian 
Colonies’, in Isabella Alexander and H. Tomás Gómez-Arostegui (eds.), Research Handbook on the History of 
Copyright Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016), pp.374-81 and Kimberlee Weatherall, ‘The 
Emergence and Development of Intellectual Property Laws in Australia and New Zealand’ in in Rochelle C. 
Dreyfuss and Justine Pila (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Intellectual Property Law (OUP, forthcoming 2016). 
6
 Weatherall, ‘The Emergence and Development of Intellectual Property Laws’, pp.[  ] 
7
 Bruce Kercher, Unruly Child: A History of Law in Australia (St Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 1995), pp. 69 - 74. 
8
 Ibid., p. 75. The 1828 Act also applied to Victoria, Queensland and the Australian Capital Territory, as they 
were carved out of New South Wales and thus took its law with them at the time of separation. Western 
Australia and South Australia were established separately and it was assumed that they took with them the 
laws of England in force at the time of settlement, 1829 and 1836 respectively. 
9
 The 1842 Copyright Act applied by paramount force but neither the 1942 Ornamental Designs Act nor the 
1843 Utility Designs Act did so.  
10
 Jeremy Finn, ‘Particularism versus Uniformity: Factors shaping the development of Australasian Intellectual 
Property Law in the Nineteenth Century’ (2000) 6 Australian Journal of Legal History 113, 119.  
11
 Bond, ‘“Cabined, Cribbed, Confined, Bound In”’, pp.381-2. 
12
 An Act for Amending the Law for Granting Patents for Inventions 1852, 15 & 16 Vict c. 83 (UK). 
13
 Routledge v. Low (1868) LR 3 HL 100. 
14
 Bond, ‘“Cabined, Cribbed, Confined, Bound In”’, p.386. 
[Type text] 
 
4 
 
These developments spurred the colonies to a legislative response and patent law was the first area 
to command attention. It was the patents regime, broadly conceived, which encompassed designs. 
The first colony to act was New South Wales, which had the largest population and the greatest 
concentration of industrial activity,15 and it enacted the Letters of Registration for Inventions Act 
1852.16 The Act empowered the NSW Governor General, acting with the advice of his Executive 
Council, to grant Letters of Registration ‘for the exclusive enjoyment and advantage for a period of 
not less than seven nor more than fourteen years for all inventions and improvements in the Arts or 
Manufactures to the author or authors or designer or designers thereof.’17 
In its focus on improvement of ‘arts and manufactures’, the Act demonstrates its influences lay not 
in the 1852 Patent Law Amendment Act recently enacted in the United Kingdom, but rather in 
earlier British proposals for a general law of arts and manufacture.18 It was concerns surrounding the 
applicability of English patent laws, combined with proposals for the first Australasian Industrial 
Exhibition, driving enactment of this first statute.19 The question of whether the colonial Legislature 
was competent to grant patents or pass a patent law occasioned some debate in the press,20 but it 
was nonetheless passed. 
The colony of Victoria was established in 1851 and three years later, with the gold rush well 
underway, it passed a Patent Act which allowed for the granting of letters patent to ‘the originator 
or discoverer of any new invention or improvement in the arts or manufactures’.21 The language of 
arts and manufactures remained, but the reference to designers was gone.22 Tasmania largely 
copied the Victorian Act in its own statute in 185823 as did Western Australia in 1872.24 South 
                                                          
15
 In 1851, the population of NSW was 181,400: G. J. R. Linge, Industrial Awakening: A Geography of Australian 
Manufacturing 1788 to 1890 (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1979), p. 53. 
16
 An Act to authorize the Governor General with the advice of the Executive Council to grant Letters of 
Registration for all inventions and improvements in the Arts or Manufactures to have the same effect as 
Letters Patent in England so far as regards this Colony 1852, 16 Vic. 24. 
17
 Ibid., s. 1. 
18
 The 1836 Select Committee on Arts and Manufactures was established to ‘inquire into the best means of 
extending a knowledge of the Arts and of the Principles of Design among the People (especially the 
Manufacturing Population of the Country’. Select Committee on Arts and Manufactures, House of Commons; 
Report from the Select Committee on Arts and their Connexion with Manufactures with the minutes of 
evidence, appendix and index (1836 9 PP 1), 568, iii. Several bills following its recommendations were 
subsequently presented to Parliament in the late 1830s. Brad Sherman and Lionel Bently, The Making of 
Modern Intellectual Property Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp.104-5. 
19
 Following the Australasian colonies’ disappointing showing in the Great Exhibition of 1851, more concerted 
efforts were made to make the most of opportunities offered by international exhibitions and to organise local 
ones, with the first being held in Sydney and Melbourne in 1854. See Peter H. Hoffenberg, ‘“Nothing Very New 
or Very Showy to Exhibit”? Australia at the Great Exhibition and After’, in Jeffrey A. Auerbach and Peter H. 
Hoffenberg (eds.), Britain, the Empire and the World at the Great Exhibition of 1851 (Hampshire: Ashgate, 
2013). The Maitland Mercury and Hunter River General Advertiser, 9 April 1851, p. 2; Sydney Morning Herald, 
9 April 1851, p.3. Sydney Morning Herald, 11 April 1851, p. 3. 
20
 Sydney Morning Herald, 11 April 1851, p. 3.  
21
 An Act to regulate Grants of Patents for Inventions in the Colony of Victoria 1854, 17 Vic. c. 15. 
22
 This Act too was repealed and replaced in 1857 with a new Act, referring now only the need to ‘promote and 
encourage the discovery of new manufactures’. An Act concerning Letters Patent for Inventions 1857, 20 Vic. 
c. 3, s. 1. 
23
 An Act to regulate the granting of Letters Patent for Inventions 1858, 22 Vic. No. 22 (Tas). 
24
 An Act to regulate Grants of Patents for Inventions in the Colony of Western Australia 1872, 36 Vic. No. 1 
(WA). 
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Australia drew on the New South Wales Act in its Patent Act of 185925 and thus adopted the same 
approach of a general law of arts and manufactures covering inventors and designers. Queensland 
adopted its own Patents Act in 1867 but although its title it referred to inventions and improvements 
in the arts and manufactures, its aim was limited to giving temporary protection to inventors more 
cheaply than the current cost of obtaining letters of registration by government petition.26   
At this stage, protection of designs shifted into the copyright sphere in some of the colonies. The 
first colonial copyright statute was passed in Victoria in 1869, at the urging of a deputation including 
designers,27 and its very first operative section related to ‘copyright of designs for articles or works 
of manufacture or art.’28 While the provisions of this Act were clearly based on British legislation 
relating to designs, the Victorian legislature did not follow the British approach of splitting designs 
into ornamental and useful categories. The Act in fact was a blend of the 1842 Ornamental Designs 
Act29 and the 1843 Utility Designs Act.30 Section 3 of the Act protected ‘the proprietor of any new 
and original design for any article or work of manufacture or art, and whether such article or work 
be for purposes of utility ornament or otherwise’.31 The Act also differed from its UK forebears in 
some reordering of words and sections and, more significantly, in the periods of protection.32 This 
Act was amended in 1872 and repealed and replaced in 1890 with a new copyright statute, in which 
the designs provisions were unchanged.33 
The next colony after Victoria to pass copyright legislation was South Australia, in 1878.34 This Act 
was closely modelled on the Victorian Statute but South Australia did away with the notion of 
different classes in which designs should be registered, leaving it to the proprietor to determine 
                                                          
25
 An Act to authorize the Governor-in-Chief, with the advice of the Executive Council, to grant Letters of 
Registration for all Inventions and Improvements in the Arts or Manufactures, to have the same effect as 
Letters Patent in England, so far as regards the Province of South Australia 1859, 22 & 23 Vic. No. 18 (SA). 
26
 An Act to Amend the Law relating to Letters of Registration for Inventions and Improvements in the Arts or 
Manufactures by granting Provisional Certificates of Registration for a Limited Period 1867, 31 Vic. No. 26 
(Qld); The Queenslander, 30 November 1867, p. 6. 
27
 The Leader, 17 April 1869, p. 12; Victoria, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 31 August 1868, pp. 
1837-8 (G. Paton Smith). 
28
 An Act to secure to Proprietors of Designs for Articles and Works of Manufacture and Art, and to Proprietors 
of Works of Literature and Fine Art, the Copyright of such Designs and Works for a limited period 1869, 33 Vic. 
No. 350, s. 3. 
29
 An Act to Consolidate and Amend the Laws Relating to the Copyright of Designs for Ornamenting Articles of 
Manufacture 1842, 5 & 6 Vic. c. 100. 
30
 An Act to Amend the Laws Relating to the Copyright of Designs 6 & 7 Vic. c. 65 (1843). 
31
 Ibid., s. 3. 
32
 The 1842 British Ornamental Designs Act offered three different levels of protection: 3 years for goods in 
classes 1 to 6, 9 and 12, 12 months for articles in classes 13 and 14 and 9 months for articles in classes 8, 10 
and 11. Moreover, the 1843 Utility Designs Act gave 3 years of protection for useful designs. By contrast, the 
Victorian Act gave 3 years of protection to articles registered in classes 1 to 5 and two years of protection to 
the remainder. The classes were almost identical to the British classes of the 1842 Ornamental Designs Act, 
with an additional class covering articles made of ivory, bone, papier-mache and other solid substances not 
already included.  
33
 The 1872 Act provided that designs falling under s3 and fine art works falling under s36 of the Copyright Act 
1869 would retain their protection under that Act even in the event they were publicly exhibited at an 
exhibition of works of industry and art: An Act to protect Exhibitors of New Inventions and Works of Industry 
and Art 1872, 36 Vic. No. 422 (Vic). See also An Act to consolidate the Law relating to Copyright 1890, 54 Vic. 
No. 1076 (Vic). 
34
 An Act to regulate the Law of Copyright and for other purposes 1868, 41 & 42 Vic. No. 45 (SA). 
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whether they would register for one, two or three years of protection.35 New South Wales passed its 
Copyright Act the following year and the provisions on design copyright were effectively identical to 
those of Victoria.36  
Western Australia, Queensland and Tasmania, however, took a different approach. Rather than 
including designs in their copyright acts, they followed the more recent UK approach. The WA 
legislature provided protection for designs in its Designs and Trade Marks Act 1884.37 In the same 
year, Queensland passed The Patents, Designs and Trade Marks Act 1884.38  In 1893 Tasmania 
passed an act which repealed its existing patents and trade marks legislation. 39  All were closely 
modelled on the UK Act of 1883 (although Western Australia continued to treat patents separately). 
They thus covered ‘new or original’ designs, to be protected for a period of five years from 
registration. They also excluded protection for sculptures.40  
A final point to be made about the provisions on designs in every one of the colonies is that they 
contained penal provisions. Anyone who applied any designs, or fraudulent imitation of a design, for 
the purposes of sale, or who sold or exposed such designs knowing they did not have the consent of 
the proprietor, would be liable to a penalty of between five and 50 pounds.41 While civil actions 
were also available, it was the summary conviction that was used and appealed in the only officially 
reported case I am aware of involving colonial design rights. In R v Radke, ex parte Dyke, Radke 
appealed his conviction under the Copyright Act 1869 (Vic) for selling a safe to which a registered 
design had been applied, knowing that the proprietor Dyke did not consent.42 The judges quashed 
the conviction, accepting Radke’s argument that an ‘iron frame for a safe’ was not an appropriate 
subject matter for copyright protection, but was more suited to a patent, commenting ‘Shape and 
configuration are not the same as a combination of parts’.43 
At the end of the nineteenth century, protection of designs in what was yet to become Australia was 
subject to a confusing array of laws, both colonial and imperial.44 This reflects the fact that the 
                                                          
35
 Ibid., s. 3. 
36
 An Act to secure to Proprietors of Works of Literature and Fine Art and to Proprietors of Designs for Articles 
and Works of Manufacture and Art the Copyright of such Works and Designs for a limited period 1879, 42 Vic. 
No. 20 (NSW). 
37
 An Act to regulate the Registration of Designs and of Trade Marks in the Colony of Western Australia 1884, 
48 Vic. No. 7, amended by An Act to alter the law relating to the procedure under ‘The Designs and Trade 
Marks Act 1884 (Vic)’ and ‘An Act to regulate grants of Patents for Inventions in the Colony of Western 
Australia 1886, 50 Vic. No. 5. 
38
 An Act to amend and consolidate the law relating to Patents for Inventions, and the Registration of Designs 
and Trade Marks 1884, (WA), No. 13 of 1884.  
39
 An Act to amend the Law relating to Patents for Inventions, and the Registration of Designs and Trade Marks 
1893, 57 Vic. No. 6 (Tas). 
40
 Designs and Trade Marks Act 1884 (WA), s. 17; Patents, Designs and Trade Marks Act 1884 (Qld), s. 3; 
Patents, Designs and Trade Marks Act 1893 (Tas), s. 4. 
41
 Copyright Act 1869 (Vic) s. 10; Copyright Act 1879 (NSW) s. 41; Copyright Act 1878 (SA) s. 10; Designs and 
Trade Marks Act 1884 (WA) s. 15; Patents, Designs and Trade Marks Act 1884 (Qld), s. 58; Patents, Designs and 
Trade Marks Act 1893 (Tas) s. 66.  
42
 R v. Radke, Ex parte Dyke (1882) 8 VLR (L) 23.  
43
 Ibid., 25. A criminal prosecution was also pursued in McLean v Wood, The Age, 30 October 1877, p. 4, but a 
civil action was contemplated in Rosenthal v Kaufman, The Argus, 6 September 1893, p. 7. 
44
 For more on the interaction of imperial law with colonial legislation in this field see Acland Giles, ‘Literary 
and Artistic Copyright in the Commonwealth’ (1905-6) 3 Commonwealth Law Review, 107, 113, Lionel Bently, ‘ 
The “Extraordinary Multiplicity” of Intellectual Property Laws in the British Colonies in the Nineteenth Century’ 
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colonies were introducing their laws at the time when, as Sherman and Bently have argued, 
intellectual property was shifting from its pre-modern to its modern form.45 While they suggest that 
in Britain the new logic was emerging by the 1850s, the Australian colonies were still experimenting 
with different structures and categories, looking to the ‘mother country’ for guidance but also, at 
least in the case of the larger colonies, striking out with a few tentative steps on their own. While 
there was no explicit prohibition against protecting something using both copyright and design 
registration (except for sculpture in WA, Tasmania and Queensland), it seems that the general 
assumption was that different regimes applied to different types of subject matters and products, 
and that it was up to the relevant creator (whether they be author, inventor or designer) to decide 
which was the most appropriate path of protection.46 
2. Second Period 1907 - 1912: Cumulation?  
In 1901, the six colonies joined together to form the Commonwealth of Australia. The new 
Constitution gave to the new Federal Parliament the power to legislate in relation to ‘copyrights, 
patents of inventions and designs, and trade marks.’47 Within five years, Parliament had exercised 
that power in relation to each of the intellectual property subject matters, passing the Patents Act in 
190348, the Copyright Act49 and the Trade Marks Act50 in 1905, and the Designs Act51 in 1906. The 
Designs Act was, in a sense, the final piece of the intellectual property puzzle. Senator Keating, who 
introduced the bill into the Senate on 20 June 1906, informed the House that it was necessary to 
pass the bill because ‘correspondence between the Governments of the Commonwealth and of the 
United Kingdom has revealed that we are not entitled to the measure of international protection 
which Britain obtained for herself and her Colonies by the Convention of 189452 unless our 
legislation covers the whole field of patents, designs, and trade marks.’53 
The bill, which became the Designs Act 1906, did not echo the UK Patents, Designs and Trade Marks 
Act 1883 in the same way as the Western Australian and Tasmanian statutes had done. Rather, it 
sought to express those legislative principles alongside their judicial interpretation and 
development.54 It was the places where the Australian Bill differed from the UK Act that occasioned 
most debate. One of the first objections related to the division of the different subject matters into 
separate legislative instruments, rather than in a single Act as in the UK. However, as Keating 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(2011) 12 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 161, Sam Ricketson, ‘The Imperial Copyright Act 1911 in Australia’, in 
Uma Suthersanen and Ysolde Gendreau (eds.), A Shifting Empire: 100 Years of the Copyright Act 1911 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2013), pp. 53-62; Bond, ‘“Cabined, Cribbed, Confined, Bound In”, 
Robert Burrell, ‘Copyright Reform in the Early Twentieth Century: the View from Australia’ (2006) 27 The 
Journal of Legal History 239, 240-46. 
45
 Sherman and Bently, Making of Modern IP Law.  
46
 A far from thorough perusal of the Victorian Copyright Register suggests that on several occasions designed 
products were registered as engravings – see for example the bamboo and rush chairs prototypes at A1719, 
2746C and 2753C (National Archives of Australia). 
47
 Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, s. 51(xviii). 
48
 Patents Act 1903 (Cth).  
49
 Copyright Act 1905 (Cth). 
50
 Trade Marks Act 1905 (Cth). 
51
 Designs Act 1906 (Cth). 
52
 Presumably this is an error, and in fact the Paris Convention 1883 (which the United Kingdom acceded to in 
1884) is intended. 
53
 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 20 June 1906, 392 (Senator John Keating).  
54
 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 20 June 1906, 394 (Senator John Keating). 
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pointed out, given that separate patents, copyright and trade marks statutes had already been 
enacted, ‘the time for the consideration of that point has passed.’55  
A second significant change made in the Australian Act was to the definition of ‘design’. The 1883 UK 
Act definition was as follows: 
‘Design’ means any design applicable to any article of manufacture, or to any substance 
artificial or natural, or partly artificial and partly natural, whether the design is applicable for 
the pattern, or for the shape or configuration, or for the ornament thereof, or for any two or 
more of such purposes, and by whatever means it is applicable, whether by printing, 
painting, embroidering, weaving, sewing, modelling, casting, embossing, engraving, staining, 
or any other means whatever, manual, mechanical, or chemical, separate or combined, not 
being a design for a sculpture, or other thing within the protection of the Sculpture 
Copyright Act of the year 1814 (fifty-fourth George the Third, chapter fifty-six).56 
The Western Australian, Queensland and Tasmanian Acts had all adopted this definition, but the 
Federal Act adopted a much shorter one: ‘“Design” means an industrial design applicable, in any way 
or by any means, to the purpose of the ornamentation, or pattern, or shape, or configuration, of an 
article, or to any two or more of those purposes.’57  
The change to the definition occasioned some debate, mainly driven by Sir Josiah Symon, a lawyer 
and Senate leader of the Free Traders. 58 Symon’s chief objection was not, however, removal of the 
distinction between sculptures and other articles, but the addition in the Australian Act of the word 
‘industrial’ to ‘industrial design’ which he considered ‘artificial, unnecessary and misleading’.59 His 
concerns were echoed by Glynn in the House of Representatives.60 Those objections were answered 
by Littleton Groom, pointing out that the word was expressly used in the International Convention, 
that it was used in the Tasmanian Act and that the definition was ‘a decided improvement upon that 
contained in the English Act’.61 In fact, the word was only used in the title of the Tasmanian Act and 
not in the definition of ‘design’. The definition was not amended and the term ‘industrial design’ 
remained.62 
The nature of the right, still referred to as the ‘copyright in the design’ was defined as meaning ‘the 
exclusive right to apply the design, or to authorize another person to apply the design, to the articles 
in respect of which it is registered.’63 This also differed slightly to the UK Act’s definition, which 
                                                          
55
 Ibid. 
56
 Patents, Designs and Trade Marks Act 1883 (UK) s. 60. 
57
 Designs Act 1906 (Cth) s. 4. 
58
 Symon had made a considerable contribution to the debates over the Copyright Act 1905 See Benedict 
Atkinson, The True History of Copyright: The Australian Experience 1905-2005 (Sydney: Sydney University 
Press, 2007), pp. 18-19, 37-41. 
59
 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 20 June 1906, 402 (Senator Sir Josiah Symon). 
60
 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 1 August 1906, 2163 (Patrick Glyn MP). 
61
 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 1 August 1906, 2165 (Littleton Groom 
MP). 
62
 As Gummow J noted in Hosokawa Micron International Inc v. Fortune (1990) 19 IPR 531 at 553, ‘the inclusion 
of the term “industrial” in the Australian definition appears to have been something of a drafting accident to 
which no great significance should be attached’. 
63
 Designs Act 1906 (Cth) s. 12. 
[Type text] 
 
9 
 
referred to ‘article of manufacture’ and made no reference to authorisation.64 Infringement of the 
design copyright was separately defined as applying the design ‘or any fraudulent or obvious 
imitation of it’ to any article in respect of which it is registered, or selling or offering for sale, such an 
article, without the licence or authority of the copyright owner.65 The phrase ‘fraudulent or obvious 
imitation’ was taken from the UK Act; although the wording of the rest of the section differed, it 
essentially achieved the same effect. The author of the design would be the owner of that design 
and, where the design was made for valuable consideration, the person on whose behalf it was 
made would be considered the author and therefore the owner.66 
The Designs Act 1906 came into force on 1 January 1907 – the same day as the Copyright Act 1905, 
passed a year earlier. Neither statute contained any reference to any potential overlap between 
them. The Copyright Act 1905 provided for the protection of books, lectures, dramatic works, 
musical works and artistic works, which were defined to include paintings, drawings, sculptures, 
engravings, etchings, prints, lithographs, woodcuts, photographs, ‘or other work of art produced by 
any process, mechanical or otherwise, by which impressions or representations of works of art can 
be taken or multiplied.’67 The right granted to owners of artistic works extended to reproducing a 
work, ‘or any material part of it, in any manner, form, or size, in any material, or by any process, or 
for any purpose.’68 The interaction between copyright in designs and copyright in artistic works was 
not discussed during debates over the Copyright Bill. While a couple of members expressed concerns 
that passing the Copyright Act would nullify rights granted under the state acts, their fears were 
allayed by the assurance that design legislation was forthcoming.69 
The lack of attention paid to the potential for overlapping protection by designs and copyright 
legislation may seem odd in retrospect, but it must be remembered that copyright covered a much 
narrower field at that time. Sherman and Bently suggest that, prior to copyright protection arising 
automatically, copyright did not offer the same advantages over design protection. Copyright 
owners were required to register their works before they could bring an infringement action, except 
in the case of sculpture. However, sculptures were excluded from design protection under the 1883 
Patents, Designs and Trade Marks Act (UK).70 In the case of drawings, engravings and other two-
dimensional works, it was generally thought that reproduction in three dimensions would not 
amount to infringement. There was thus little scope for overlap.71  A second explanation can be 
found in the Gorell Committee’s 1909 view that any overlapping should be tolerated to the 
advantage of copyright and design owners.72 I have not located any judicial decisions dealing with 
the overlap during this period so no further assistance can be found there. 
3. Third Period 1913 – 1968: Demarcation 
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The Copyright Act 1905 did not last long. In 1912, it was repealed and replaced by a statute which 
implemented the UK’s Copyright Act 1911.73 The UK, or Imperial, Act was annexed in the Schedule to 
the Copyright Act 1912. This statute specified that copyright subsisted in ‘every original literary, 
dramatic, musical and artistic work’ but introduced a different definition of ‘artistic works’, which 
was defined to include ‘works of painting, drawing, sculpture and artistic craftsmanship, and 
architectural works of art and engravings and photographs.74  No criteria or standard of artistic or 
aesthetic merit was laid down. The statute also introduced a broader approach to the rights created 
in respect of works, to include the ‘right to produce or reproduce the work or any substantial part 
thereof in any material form whatsoever’.75 Having extended the rights and the subject matter, the 
statute did address the potential overlap between such copyright works and designs. Section 22 
provided that the Act did not apply to ‘designs capable of being registered under the [Designs Act 
1906], except designs which, though capable of being so registered, are not used or intended to be 
used as models or patterns to be multiplied by any industrial process.’76  
The only member who queried the exclusion of registrable designs in the House of Representatives 
was Sir Robert Best.77 He argued that the exclusion of designs under the Copyright Act was ‘unjust to 
the enterprising men, who pay highly to secure the designs of great artists, because a design 
registered under the Designs and Patents Act is protected for five years only’.78 However, he was 
assuaged when he was reminded that earlier in the week Parliament had passed legislation allowing 
registration to be extended for two further periods of five years each, following a similar 
amendment being made in the UK.79 
The interpretation of section 22 has given rise to considerable difficulty over the years.80 Clearly, the 
intention behind it was to avoid dual protection under both copyright and designs law, forcing 
artistic works under the former head and industrially produced products under the latter head. 
However, it did not completely exclude the operation of copyright in relation to designs which can 
be registered under the Designs Act, but rather ‘cut down its ambit’.81 Thus, a drawing which could 
also be a registrable design if applied to an article would not be protected by copyright law against 
being reproduced in three dimensions, and would have to be registered under the Designs Act to 
gain such protection. However, such a drawing would still be protected against reproduction in two 
dimensions under the Copyright Act (because in such a case it would not fulfil the criteria of a design 
under the Designs Act as being applied to an article).  Moreover, even where such drawings were 
also potentially registrable as designs, copyright would continue to treat them as artistic works if 
there was no intention for such works to be used industrially (‘as models or patterns to be multiplied 
by any industrial process’) and they would be protected by the Copyright Act 1912.  
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With only a few amendments of any significance in the 1930s,82 the Copyright Act 1912 continued in 
force for fifty six years. Despite the steadily rising number of design applications and registrations, 
only a handful of cases relating to designs came before the courts in the period up to 1968,83 of 
which only one involved the operation of section 22 of the Copyright Act. In Buzacott & Co v Dutch,84 
the plaintiff failed in its action for infringement of copyright in its catalogue containing illustrations 
of its gates, fences, seats and articles in tube and wire. The NSW Supreme Court found that the 
illustrations of the articles were engravings under the Copyright Act, but also designs which were 
capable of registration under the Designs Act 1906 and were intended to be used as models or 
patterns to be multiplied by an industrial process. Thus, section 22 operated to exclude their 
protection under copyright law. 
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Pages from a 1915 Buzacott catalogue.85  
Although the judge in this case indicated some unhappiness with the decision he considered he was 
bound to make,86 the very small number of cases being litigated means no great level of local 
dissatisfaction with section 22 is perceptible.87 However, this was not the case in the UK, the 
jurisdiction to which the Australian courts repeatedly turned for precedent in the small number of 
decisions coming before them. In King Features Syndicate v O & M Kleeman88 the House of Lords 
held that the copyright in ‘Pop-Eye’ cartoons was infringed by the unauthorised manufacture of 
‘Pop-Eye’ dolls and brooches copied from those cartoons, notwithstanding section 22. Although the 
Pop-Eye merchandise was manufactured industrially, their Lordships found that copyright continued 
to operate because at the time the cartoons were made the artist had no intention to use them 
industrially. When the Gregory Committee was appointed ten years later to look into possible 
reform of copyright law in the UK, it paid particular attention to this case, stating it demonstrated 
the inequitable results that could flow from making the protection of copyright turn upon the 
intention of the artist, as mandated by section 22 of the Imperial Copyright Act. Moreover, the 
Committee also took the view that the case meant that dual protection would be available under 
both copyright and designs law, something it considered undesirable. 89   
Five years after the Gregory Committee delivered its report, the UK amended its copyright law. 90  In 
Australia, this brought to an end the long period of stability which had followed the enactment of 
the Copyright Act 1912.91 In 1958 the Attorney-General appointed a Committee, chaired by a former 
attorney-general and judge J A Spicer, to consider whether any of those amendments should be 
incorporated into Australian law. The Spicer Committee devoted only 9 paragraphs to the question 
of industrial designs.92 It took the view that ‘extensive inquiry into the revision of the Designs Act’93 
went beyond its terms of reference but did briefly note that a recent New Zealand Committee had 
recommended that all designs which were original artistic works should be protected as copyright 
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works. The Committee indicated that, had it been authorised to make recommendations regarding 
reform of design law, it might have taken a similar approach. In the end, however, it simply adopted 
the discussion of the UK Gregory Committee in relation to the overlap between designs and 
copyright.  
To conclude, during this lengthy period of history, it appears that the approach in Australia was one 
of demarcation between copyright and designs (notwithstanding the decision in King Features v 
Kleeman). Which regime would apply would depend on the form in which the work was, or was 
intended, to be exploited. If it was exploited as a design and applied to articles, then it would fall 
under designs law; if, however, the work was exploited in two dimensions, such as a drawing or 
painting, it would be protected by copyright.  
4. Fourth Period 1969 – 1980: Demarcation 
After the Spicer Committee reported, it was to be another 7 years before the Australian Government 
took any legislative action.  Eventually it passed the Copyright Act 1968, which made a number of 
changes to copyright law, including an attempt to re-shape the copyright/designs overlap. The Act 
continued to provide copyright for a closed list of ‘works’, being literary, artistic, dramatic and 
musical works. It remained the case that eligibility for copyright protection turned solely on ‘skill, 
labour and judgment’ rather than any artistic merit.94 It also protected ‘subject matter other than 
works’, being films, sound recordings, broadcasts and published editions. As with the Copyright Act 
1956 (UK), ‘artistic works’ were protected against reproduction in ‘a material form’.95 This was 
limited by section 71, which provided that making an object in three dimensions would not infringe 
copyright in a work in two dimensions, and vice versa, if the object in question ‘would not appear to 
persons who are not experts in relation to objects of that kind to be a reproduction of the artistic 
work.’96 These provisions meant there was potential for designs to be protected under both 
copyright law and design legislation. The overlap was to be managed in sections 74-77 of the Act 
which essentially reproduced the scheme of the 1956 UK Act with a few drafting amendments. 
The scheme set up by these Acts operated so that the use of an artistic work as an industrial design 
would not affect any subsistence of copyright in that work. It would, however, affect whether certain 
acts would be found to be infringements of that copyright.97 A new concept, the ‘corresponding 
design’, was introduced in an attempt to clarify the distinction between artistic works and designs. 
This ‘corresponding design’ was defined as: ‘in relation to an artistic work…a design that, when 
applied to an article, results in a reproduction of that work.’98 Two potential situations were 
addressed: one arising where copyright subsisted in an artistic work, and a ‘corresponding design’ 
was registered under the Designs Act 1906; the other arising where copyright subsisted in an artistic 
work, and a ‘corresponding design’ was applied industrially to articles which are sold, let for hire, 
offered or exposed for sale or hire, but that corresponding design was not registered under the 
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Designs Act in respect of those articles. The Copyright Regulations 1969 provided that a design 
would be deemed to be ‘industrially applied’ if it was applied to more than fifty articles.99 
In both situations, it would not be an infringement of copyright to do anything in relation to an 
article which would be within the scope of the protection of the Designs Act, whether the design was 
registered (section 75) or not registered but industrially applied (section 77) either during the 15 
years of actual or putative protection, or thereafter. In relation to protection after the expiration of 
15 years, it would not be an infringement of copyright to do anything within the scope of copyright 
in the design ‘as extended to all associated designs and articles.’100   
Again, in both situations copyright would remain in the design/artistic work in question, but could 
only be infringed by doing some other act not covered by the protection granted under the Designs 
Act. This made more explicit the distinction between works in three-dimensions, or as applied to 
articles, and works in two-dimensions. As Attorney-General Bowen explained in his second reading 
speech: ‘Thus, if a cartoon character is used to decorate children’s plates, so as to use it after the 
expiration of 15 years from the time those plates came on the market will not infringe any rights in 
respect of the artistic copyright in the drawing of the character, but to reproduce it in a magazine 
would be an infringement of copyright.’101 Thus, an artistic work, such as a cartoon character, could 
be registered as a design and exploited industrially during the fifteen years, during which time the 
owner could use their design registration to control uses that fell within the scope of the registration 
and the copyright in an artistic work to control other uses; following the expiry of the registration 
period, copyright would continue to apply to the latter uses. 
A further important amendment came in the form of regulations passed the following year. Again 
echoing the UK scheme to mediate overlaps, the Design Regulations 1969 provided that designs for 
articles in certain specified classes would be excluded from registration under the Designs Act 1906. 
These classes were: works of sculpture other than casts or models used or intended to be used as 
models or patterns to be multiplied by an industrial process; wall plaques; medals; and, ‘articles that 
are primarily literary or artistic in character and on which there is printing’, such as book jackets, 
calendars, certificate, dressmaking patters, maps, plans and postcards.102 Such articles could not lose 
copyright protection, even if a corresponding design were to be applied industrially, by virtue of 
section 74 of the Copyright Act 1968.  
Two years after the 1968 Act was passed, a Committee was appointed by the new Attorney-General 
to give a more thorough examination of the law relating to designs, to recommend whether any 
changes needed to be made to the law, and also to consider the introduction of a system of ‘utility 
models’, or petty patents.103 This Committee was chaired by Justice Robert Franki and delivered two 
separate reports in 1973; the first report dealt with designs and the second with patents.  
In relation to designs, the Franki Committee considered a number of problems or potential problems 
with the law as it then stood. Once again, the UK law was taken as the starting point and each 
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section of both statutes was compared, with a discussion of relevant cases. Considerable attention 
was paid to the copyright-design overlap issues. The Franki Report had noted that since the passing 
of the Copyright Act 1968, which had adopted the UK position, there had been developments both 
legislative and judicial in the UK requiring consideration. Indeed, in 1968, the UK had passed an 
amending Act which altered the position there. The Design Copyright Act 1968 (UK) allowed dual 
protection lasting 15 years from the date on which the corresponding design was first published.104 
The Franki Committee made inquiries as to what had motivated such a change, and was informed 
that it responded to representations made by manufacturers of art metal work and jewellery.105 
The Franki Committee was not, however, persuaded of the value of such provision and declared it 
was opposed to dual protection, despite having received a number of submissions (‘including some 
well-documented submissions from the Walt Disney Organisation’106) in its favour. It stated firmly: ‘It 
seems to us that a person should be able to make whatever use of an article he pleases if, in 
accordance with the usual practice in the industrial field, he finds on a proper examination of the 
records that the article is not covered by any patent or design protection in Australia.’107 The Report 
referred to a number of recent UK cases which demonstrated the uncertainty that flowed from dual, 
or cumulative, protection.108 It also considered whether it would be desirable from an international 
point of view to adopt dual protection, noting that some had argued before it that if dual protection 
were introduced Australian manufacturers would be able to obtain the benefit of copyright 
protection for works of applied art in other Berne Convention countries, without having to go to the 
trouble of registering designs. However, the Committee took the view that the breadth of the 
definition of ‘artistic work’ in Australia would mean that dual protection would open up copyright 
protection to a broader range of articles in Australia than would be protected by copyright in 
overseas countries. It further thought that the imprecise definition of ‘works of applied art’ would 
simply lead to greater uncertainty for manufacturers.109 As a result, the Report recommended 
retaining sections 74 – 77 with certain modifications, as well as alterations to a number of other 
aspects of the Designs Act. 
Further developments occurring in the UK in this period also required consideration by the Franki 
Committee. The first was the case of Dorling v Honnor Marine Ltd.110 In this case, the Court of Appeal 
had found that where the artistic copyright lay in two-dimensional plans for dinghies, which had 
been produced industrially in three dimensions, the owner of copyright in the plans retained full 
copyright because the corresponding design was unregistrable – the plans themselves being 
unregistrable according to the regulations, and the parts, kits and shape of the completed boat being 
unregistrable on the basis of functionality.111 This case, and those which followed it, were said to 
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lead to ‘bizarre outcomes’112 and to be ‘illogical’113 in giving the more expansive protection offered 
by copyright to things found ineligible for the lesser protection of design rights. 
The second development came when the House of Lords was called upon to determine the meaning 
of the final phrase of the definition of ‘design’ which excluded from protection features of shape or 
configuration ‘dictated solely by the function which the article to be made in that shape or 
configuration has to perform’. In Amp Inc v Utilux Pty Ltd, Lord Reid held that: ‘If the shape is not 
there to appeal to the eye but solely to make the article work then this provision excludes it from 
statutory protection.’114 The Franki Committee considered this approach should not be reflected in 
the Australian legislation, which should be as broad as practicable. While function itself should not 
be capable of protection through design legislation, it should not be a bar to registration.  
In addition, a series of cases confirmed that not only were technical drawings considered artistic 
works, but that they could be infringed by indirect copying of a three-dimensional work produced 
from them,115 thereby expanding the remit of copyright for such works. This undermined the role of 
the ‘non-expert’ defence, which provided that the making of an object in three dimensions would 
not infringe copyright in the artistic work in two dimensions, and vice versa, if it did not appear to a 
non-expert to be a reproduction.  
Notwithstanding these UK developments, there was no case law explicitly concerning the overlap 
between copyright and designs in Australia during this period. The regime of demarcation continued 
but the question of whether functional designs were excluded from design protection did divide 
opinions in the courts.116 Because UK developments revealed that such exclusions could re-enliven 
copyright protection in respect of functional designs, concerns were growing about the potential for 
over-broad protection for industrial products. 
5. Fifth Period 1981 – 1990: Demarcation 
Although both Franki Reports were delivered in 1973, the government first took action on the 
second one, which had found that there was a ‘gap’ in the law for functional inventions that were 
not inventive enough for patent protection. In 1979 Parliament passed legislation amending the 
Patents Act 1952 which created a system of petty patents – patents with the same inventiveness 
threshold as a standard patent but which were easier and cheaper to obtain and would last only six 
years.117 
Two years later, Parliament turned its attention to amendments to the law relating to designs.  The 
Designs Amendment Act 1981 enacted a number of the Committee’s recommendations. As a matter 
of nomenclature, the title of the Designs Act was altered from ‘Copyright in Industrial Designs’ to 
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simply ‘designs’.118 The Franki Report had observed that the Act did not give merely a right against 
copying, but rather a monopoly in the design, meaning the use of the word ‘copyright’ was ‘not only 
inappropriate but …likely to be confusing’.119 The definition of ‘design’ was also amended and a path 
between the UK Act and the existing Australian Act was chosen. The UK definition, derived from the 
1919 Act as amended in 1949, was as follows: 
In this Act the expression ‘design’ means features of shape, configuration, pattern or 
ornament applied to an article by any industrial process or means, being features which in 
the finished article appeal to and are judged solely by the eye, but does not include a 
method or principle of construction or features of shape or configuration which are dictated 
solely by the function which the article to be made in that shape or configuration has to 
perform.120 
The definition adopted in the Designs Amendment Act was: 
‘Design’ means features of shape, configuration, pattern or ornamentation applicable to an 
article, being features that, in the finished article, can be judged by the eye, but does not 
include a method or principle of construction.121 
The Franki Report had approved of the phrase ‘features of shape, configuration, pattern or 
ornamentation’ on the basis its meaning was reasonably well established by the courts and a new 
form of words might lead to uncertainty in litigation. It did, however, make what it considered to be 
some improvements to the drafting.122 Responding to the developments noted above, in particular 
the decision in Amp v Utilux, the Australian Act also departed from the UK definition in relation to 
the exclusion of features of shape or configuration ‘dictated solely by the function which the article 
to be made in that shape or configuration has to perform’. Not only was the UK phrase to be omitted 
from the definition, an additional section was added stating that ‘An application for registration of a 
design shall not be refused, and a registered design is not invalid, by reason only that the design 
consists of, or includes, features of shape or configuration that serve, or serve only, a functional 
purpose.’123 
Two other alterations made in 1981 were to abolish the practice of registering designs in classes, as 
had already occurred in the UK, and to extend the period of protection from a maximum of fifteen 
years, to a maximum of sixteen years. No specific action was taken in relation to the overlap 
between copyright and designs at that time, but a new cause for concern was emerging. This was 
that the expansion of copyright to cover technical drawings, reproduced in both three and two 
dimensions, would lead to anti-competitive restriction of the spare parts market. Faced with this 
problem in the UK, the House of Lords created a ‘spare parts exception’ to copyright law in British 
Leyland Motor Corp v Armstrong Patents Co Ltd.124 The exception was not applied in Australia by 
Wilcox J who referred to it in the Federal Court as ‘remarkable’ and ‘a major qualification upon the 
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scheme laid out – wisely or unwisely – under the United Kingdom copyright and designs 
legislation.’125 He held that design drawings excluded from the definition of ‘design’ in the Designs 
Act 1906, by reason of being ‘a method or principle of construction’, retained copyright 
protection.126  
At the same time, several other cases before the courts demonstrated that the demarcation 
approach could operate to deny both copyright and design protection in cases where artistic works 
were registrable as corresponding designs, but had not been registered prior to being industrially 
applied – results which were perceived to lead to injustice in those particular cases.127 Nevertheless, 
the policy of demarcation continued to be considered appropriate, despite the difficulties 
occasioned by negotiating its boundaries.  As Deane J explained in the High Court decision of Hart v 
Edwards Hot Water Systems:  
The present case falls in an area in which one should be conscious of the distinct functions 
performed by the law of copyright and the law of patents and industrial designs and of the 
desirability of maintaining at least the semblance of a boundary between their respective 
fields of operation. The convoluted path by which a three-dimensional object has been held 
to be an infringement of the copyright in a technical drawing which has been neither 
factually copied or even seen illustrates the incursions which copyright – with its extended 
life but more limited protection, its lack of requirement of novelty or true inventiveness and 
its minimal standards of originality – is capable of making into what would ordinarily be seen 
as the proper domains of the law of patents and the law of industrial designs.128 
6 The Sixth Period 1990 - 2003: Partial cumulation and demarcation 
In light of the ongoing problems, the Government commissioned a further investigation by the 
Attorney-General’s Department, which published a discussion paper and received submissions in 
1987.129  In 1989 an amending Act was passed, altering a number of aspects of copyright law and 
commencing on 1 October 1990.130 In terms of the copyright/design overlap, the Act repealed the 
much criticised section 71 (the ‘non-expert’ defence) in its entirety.131 Still more significantly, it 
introduced for the first time, partial cumulation of designs and copyright, by amending sections 74, 
75 and 77 in order to ensure that three-dimensional industrial products could not receive copyright 
protection, but two-dimensional ones could.  
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It achieved this by amending the definition of ‘corresponding design’ to add the phrase ‘but does not 
include a design consisting solely of features of two-dimensional pattern or ornament applicable to a 
surface of an article.’132 Limiting the exclusion of copyright to three-dimensional works meant that 
the two-stage process which dealt with the situation during and after registration was no longer 
necessary. Thus, the sections limiting the operation of copyright where a corresponding design had, 
and had not, been registered could be simplified.133 Further language was added to avoid the 
outcome in Dorling v Honnor Marine Ltd134 and subsequent cases holding that designs which were 
unregistrable because they were functional, nor not new and original, or could not be ‘judged by the 
eye’ retained copyright protection.135 Thus, section 77(3) was added in an attempt to make it clear 
that it was only where the corresponding design was unregistrable through the operation of the 
Regulations excluding certain designs from registrability that copyright in an artistic work would 
remain in force.136  
Copyright protection was not, however, removed for all three dimensional artistic works that had 
been industrialised. Section 77 was altered to carve out an exception for buildings, models of 
buildings and works of artistic craftsmanship. Copyright would therefore continue to subsist in such 
works unless they were registered as designs, whereupon they would lose copyright and rely solely 
on the protection given by registration. This was not a recommendation of the Franki Committee nor 
covered in the Attorney-General’s discussion paper. According to the Explanatory Memorandum, the 
reason for introducing this exception was because it was considered that such works are ‘more 
appropriately protected under the [Copyright] Act whether industrially applied or not.’137  
The 1989 Act had only passed upon the assurance that the Attorney-General’s Department would 
conduct an urgent review of designs law. A Committee was subsequently appointed under Professor 
James Lahore to carry out an Inquiry into Intellectual Property Protection for Industrial Designs. 138  
The Lahore Committee was deeply critical of a number of aspects of the amendments just passed. 
First, it considered that the Government’s policy decision to deny copyright protection to three 
dimensional works could not be successfully implemented unless the definitions of both ‘design’ and 
‘corresponding design’ were changed.139 The problem with the definition of ‘corresponding design’ 
was that it referred back to the definition of ‘design’, itself to be found in the Designs Act 1906 
rather than the Copyright Act. Designs that did not fall within that definition would likewise also not 
be ‘corresponding designs’ and thus would not be affected by the changes in the Copyright 
Amendment Act designed to deprive them of copyright protection. To take the example given by the 
Committee, in the case of Warman International v Envirotech the drawings in question were held 
not to be designs within the definition of the Designs Act because they constituted a method or 
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principle of construction; therefore they were entitled to copyright protection.140 This would be 
unchanged under the amendments, a result the Committee called ‘astonishing’, given that a 
principal reason for amending the Act was to deny copyright protection to utilitarian three-
dimensional articles.141 A second problem with the definition of ‘corresponding design’ was the 
exclusion of designs consisting solely of features of two-dimensional pattern or ornamentation 
applicable to the surface of an article. The Committee pointed out it was not clear how this 
definition would apply to woven or embossed designs, or where the pattern lay in the thickness of 
the material.142 
Turning to the new definition of ‘design’, as amended in 1981, the Committee’s discussion focussed 
on the explicit exclusion found in the words ‘does not include a method or principle of construction.’ 
Recent court decisions interpreting the words had given rise to some dissatisfaction.143 In Warman v 
Envirotch, an interlocutory hearing, Wilcox J found that design drawings which contained 
information as to data and tolerances necessary to manufacture the parts in question were excluded 
from the definition of design because they were ‘a method of principle or construction’.144 Similarly, 
in Firmagroup Australia Pty Ltd v Byrne & Davidson Doors (Vic) Pty Ltd,145 the High Court upheld 
lower court decisions which had found there was no infringement of registered designs for handles 
and locks for shutter (garage) doors because what was copied were general functional features 
rather than features which ‘convey[ed] an idea of unique shape or configuration.’146  These decisions 
gave rise to the perception that the Designs Act inadequately protected functional articles, while 
copyright over-protected them.147  
The Committee considered that a method or principle of construction was more appropriately 
protected by patent law than by design law, but it also found that specifically excluding methods or 
principles of construction from the definition of design had not led to an improvement in designs 
protection and that, in fact, recent decisions were detrimental to it. It thus recommended changing 
the definition of design to remove the explicit exclusion and to place more emphasis on the form of 
an article as being the subject matter of protection.148 It considered that the chief problem with 
giving broad protection to functional designs lay in the definition of infringement and that existing 
case law gave insufficient guidance on the concept of fraudulent or obvious imitation. The Report 
recommended abandoning that approach completely, as had already occurred in the UK back in 
1949. Instead, it recommended adopting a test of ‘substantial reproduction’ although it added that 
since design registration was a monopoly rather than a right to prevent copying, it would be 
important to ensure that reproduction was not interpreted to require proof of copying.149 
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The Lahore Committee was not alone in considering that the amended provisions of the Copyright 
Act created as many, if not more, problems than they resolved.150 And so, shortly after it submitted 
its report, a reference was made to the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) to review the law 
of designs.151 The ALRC carried out the widest-ranging inquiry to date on Australian designs law, 
consulting with designers, manufacturers, patent attorneys, lawyers and interest groups, as well as 
the Australian Intellectual Property Office and relevant government departments and agencies. It 
also conducted a survey of the design industry which involved about 1000 individual designers and 
manufacturers around Australia and considered recent developments in the European Community, 
as well as New Zealand, North America, Asia and Africa. 
The ALRC Report stated that ‘the law has not kept up with changes in the scope of what designers 
are doing. Design is an integral part of manufacturing and marketing but designs law tends to treat it 
as a minor cosmetic aspect of a product. For designers and manufacturers this mismatch and the 
outdated legal concept of design have been the source of much dissatisfaction over many years.’152 
The Report noted that while modern design encompassed a broad range of activities, concepts and 
philosophies, the legal concept of design was far narrower and did not extend to non-visual features 
considered by designers to be important, such as functionality, safety considerations, feel, weight, 
ergonomics and so on. The ALRC pointed out that some of these aspects would fall to be protected 
under other areas of intellectual property law, such as trade marks (which now extended to cover 
shapes, colours, sound and scent), patents, passing off or breach of confidence.153 
The submissions and the survey revealed to the ALRC that there were a number of perceived 
problems with the operation of design law in Australia. These included an impression that design law 
was not regarded highly by those who sought to benefit commercially from their designs, the lack of 
protection for function, the narrow interpretation of visual appearance, the feeling that registration 
took too long, was too costly and granted too easily to non-novel designs, that litigation was too 
costly and victory too uncertain.154 The ALRC concluded that Australia should continue to provide 
protection for industrial designs, but that the system was in need of reform. Many of the concerns 
expressed by stakeholders and others could be addressed within the existing system. However, it 
also considered that other concerns could not be addressed within the registered design right and 
that broader review and reform was necessary. 
Although many of the submissions to the ALRC identified a gap in protection for functional designs, 
and called for design protection to be expanded to protect function directly, the ALRC concluded 
that design legislation should continue to focus narrowly on the visual appearance of a product and 
that any gap opening up as a result of the failure to protect function was more properly addressed 
by reforming Australia’s petty patent system and not by extending design law.155 In addition, the 
ALRC was drawn to arguments in favour of supplementing the current design protection with an 
                                                          
150
 See Wayne M. Condon, ‘The Copyright Amendment Act 1989 and the Copyright/Design Overlap in Australia’ 
(1990) 12 European Intellectual Property Review 84; Ricketson, ‘Towards a Rational Basis’. 
151
 Australian Law Reform Commission, Designs Report, Terms of Reference, No 74 (1995) (‘ALRC Report’).  
152
 ALRC Report, [2.1]. 
153
 ALRC Report, [2.20] – [2.27]. 
154
 ALRC Report, [2.42] – [2.48]. 
155
 ALRC Report, [3.42] – [3.53]. 
[Type text] 
 
22 
 
unregistered, anti-copying design right. However, as this went beyond its terms of reference, the 
Commission recommended a separate review should be commissioned to investigate this.156  
To sum up, the 1989 amendments introduced a new policy of cumulative protection for two-
dimensional artistic works, while retaining demarcation for three dimensional works. The change in 
the definition of ‘corresponding design’ made it clear that when applied to a product also in two 
dimensions (ie as pattern or ornamentation) such works could acquire both design registration and 
copyright protection. A less strict form of demarcation applied to buildings, models of buildings and 
works of artistic craftsmanship, in that they could receive either copyright or design protection but 
not both, while other three-dimensional works were subject to strict demarcation and unable to be 
protected by copyright if applied industrially. Dissatisfaction continued, however, with the way the 
boundary was drawn and in particular questions were raised as to whether the language of the 
legislation adequately implemented its intention. 
7. Seventh Period 2004 – present: Partial cumulation and demarcation 
The ALRC delivered its report in 1995 but it was not until 2002 that the Government introduced an 
entirely new design law bill into Parliament – the first in almost one hundred years. In his second 
reading speech, Warren Entsch MP explained that ‘This Bill is intended to provide a simple to use, 
cost effective designs system that provides designers with enforceable rights.’157 The new Act, which 
received assent on 17 December 2003, implemented many, although not all, of the ALRC’s 
recommendations. 
First, the Act introduced a new definition of ‘design’ as follows: ‘design, in relation to a product, 
means the overall appearance of the product resulting from one or more visual features of the 
product.’158 ‘Visual features’ was in turn defined in section 7 as including ‘the shape, configuration, 
pattern and ornamentation of the product’.159 The section excluded the feel of a product, the 
materials used in the product and, in relation to products with one or more indefinite dimensions, 
the indefinite dimension and more than one repeat of any pattern.160 The ALRC had recommended 
changing the word ‘article’ to the word ‘product’ as being more ‘contemporary’ and removing any 
reference to a design being ‘applied to’ a product, on the basis it often required stretching of 
language to suggest that something like a shape is ‘applied to’ and article.161 The ALRC had further 
recommended including surface and colour to the list of visual features protected but these words 
were not added to the definition.162 The removal of the phrase ‘judged by the eye’ followed the 
ALRC’s finding that it was unnecessary, and similarly the ALRC had considered that any reference to 
consumer or eye appeal, as was found in the UK legislation at that time was unnecessarily 
complex.163 
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Finally, the Act attempted once again to ensure that a functional design could fall within the 
definition of design and would therefore not be excluded from the operation of the copyright 
exceptions to infringement found in sections 74-77 of the Copyright Act. The 1981 Amendments had 
proven ineffectual to counter the earlier lines of authority.164 Section 7 thus provided that a visual 
feature ‘may, but need not, serve a functional purpose’.165 The exclusion from the definition of 
design of ‘methods and principles of construction’ was also removed. The ALRC Report noted that 
the Federal Court had not been able to identify a clear meaning of the concept dictated solely by 
function166 and that the courts had interpreted the exclusion in such a way that design protection 
was too narrow to cover useful products like locks and pumps.167  
The second key change made by the 2003 Act was to change the threshold for registration from 
‘new or original’ (which had remained unchanged since 1906) to ‘new and distinctive when 
compared with the prior art base’.168 This responded to the ALRC’s findings that the novelty test was 
seen as unacceptable by designers and manufacturers, and that the perception was that anything 
could be registered as long as it was not identical to another registered design. The Act defined a 
design as being ‘new’ unless it was ‘identical to a design that forms part of the prior art base’ and as 
being ‘distinctive’ unless it was ‘substantially similar in overall impression to a design that forms part 
of the prior art base.’169 When assessing substantial similarity, the standard to be applied was to be 
that of the ‘informed user’. The ALRC had drawn this concept from the EC’s proposed Council 
Regulation on designs.170 
A third change also related to the scope of protection was to alter the definition of infringement. 
The ALRC’s consultations and submissions had revealed high levels of dissatisfaction with the courts’ 
narrow interpretation of design protection, particularly following the High Court decision in 
Firmagroup.171 The ALRC had proposed that the test for infringement should be one of ‘substantial 
similarity in overall impression’ to be assessed by an informed user. It also recommended that the 
test of ‘fraudulent imitation’ be removed and a non-exclusive list of factors be provided in the 
legislation for consideration in cases of infringement.172 These recommendations were followed in 
the 2003 Act.173 
The 2003 Act made a number of other significant changes in relation to the registration process and 
also reduced the term of protection from a maximum of 16 years under the 1906 Act to a maximum 
of 10 years – an initial period of five years with a renewal period of five years.174 The ALRC had in fact 
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recommended reducing protection to fifteen years as this is recommended under the Hague 
Convention (should Australia decide in future to join), while conceding that ‘None of the suggested 
rationales for design protection provide any persuasive argument for any particular period of 
protection.175 The Explanatory Memorandum to the Designs Bill stated it would not be in Australia’s 
interests to provide a period of protection in excess of its international obligations (under TRIPS), as 
Australia is a net importer of intellectual property.176  
In relation to ownership, the Act continued to provide, as it had since 1906, that the designer would 
be the first owner unless the design were created in the course of employment or pursuant to a 
contract, in which case the employer or other contracting party would be the owner.177 This echoed 
the position under the Copyright Act 1968, except in relation to commissioned works, which are 
owned by the author rather than the commissioner (with some exceptions relating to certain 
photographs, portraits and engravings).178 
Another innovation in the 2003 Act was to introduce a spare parts exclusion from design 
protection.179 This was not a recommendation of the ALRC, which had examined the issue of spare 
parts but concluded the best approach would be to include a procedure for referral of potentially 
competitive designs to the Trade Practices Commission (now the Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission). The Government, however, considered such an exception was necessary to 
ensure effective competition, particularly in the motor vehicle market.180  
At the same time as the Designs Bill was introduced, a second bill was introduced to amend the 
sections 74 – 77 of the Copyright Act. The first amendments made were to the definition of 
‘corresponding design’. As both the ALRC and the Lahore Report had noted, this definition gave rise 
to several problems. As noted above, the first problem was that if the work in question did not fall 
within the definition of ‘design’ in the Design Act, it could not be a corresponding design and would 
therefore retain copyright protection, contrary to the intention of the legislation. The second 
problem arose because s17A of the Designs Act provided that in the case where copyright subsisted 
in an artistic work and an application were sought for registration of a corresponding design, that 
design would not be treated as being other than new or original by reason of any previous use of 
publication of the artistic work. However, since ‘corresponding design’ was defined not to include 
two-dimensional features of pattern or ornament, such aspects would not be rescued by the 
provision and would be unable to be registered. For example, a published drawing for a fabric design 
could not be registered prior to manufacturing it because it would no longer be new.181 A third 
problem lay in the use of the word ‘applicable’, which was unclear in relation to designs which are 
not applied to a surface but form part of an article, such as embroidery, knits, weaves and other 
textured designs. 
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The definition was thus altered in the 2003 Act to read  
Corresponding design, in relation to a design, means visual features of shape or 
configuration which, when embodied in a product, result in a reproduction of that work, 
whether or not the visual features constitute a design which is capable of being registered 
under the Designs Act 2003.182  
Further, ‘embodied in’ was defined to include ‘woven into, impressed on, or worked into’ a 
product.183 By limiting the definition of ‘corresponding design’ to ‘visual features of shape or 
configuration’, the statute continued the policy of ensuring that two dimensional features would fall 
outside the definition and thus outside the exclusion of copyright protection in section 77. They 
could therefore be protected by both designs law and copyright. 
A second change sought to clarify the status of works of artistic craftsmanship. The problem with 
excluding works of artistic craftsmanship lay in the uncertainty of the category and the Lahore 
Committee had noted that the courts in both the UK and Australia had experienced difficulty in 
determining whether a work was a work of artistic craftsmanship.184 Under section 10 of the 
Copyright Act 1968, it was also ambiguous as to whether a work could be simultaneously a work of 
artistic craftsmanship and another kind of artistic works (such as a painting, sculpture or building). 
The 2003 Amending Act altered the wording of section 10 to make it clear that this was possible.185 A 
related amendment was to add a provision to s77 that explicitly provided that for the purposes of 
that section ‘building or model of a building does not include a portable building such as a shed, a 
pre-constructed swimming pool, a demountable building or similar portable building.’186 This 
implemented the conclusion of the ALRC and the Lahore Committee that small portable buildings 
and pools were not suitable for copyright protection.187 A further amendment to section 77 added a 
new section 77(1A) which operated to ensure that the manufacture of products reproducing such a 
specification or representation would not be a copyright infringement.188  
The problem of ‘plan-to-plan’ copying was also addressed. This was the issue which arose when 
engineering drawings were copied (either directly or indirectly), leading to a finding of copyright 
infringement.189 Because the immunity in section 77 related only to applying a corresponding design 
to an article and not to copying in two dimensions as preparatory to making a product, the new 
section 77A extended the immunity from copyright infringement to cover reproductions of artistic 
works made in the course of or incidental to making a product where such reproductions were 
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produced by copying the three-dimensional product. However, direct copying of plans remained a 
copyright infringement.190 
The amendments made in 2003 therefore did not change the underlying policy of demarcation and 
partial cumulation, but simply shifted a few of the borders. The dual protection of two dimensional 
designs was clarified, works of artistic craftsmanship and architectural works continued to be given 
the choice of regimes, and other three dimensional works exploited industrially remained in the 
design regime. Small portable buildings and pre-fabricated swimming pools were moved from the 
category of copyright to being required to rely on design protection, as were two dimensional design 
drawings. 
Part B Analysis / Assessment 
Since the mid-nineteenth century, Australia has moved through different approaches to the 
design/copyright overlap. For a short period after Federation it had a system of dual or cumulative 
protection, although this appears to be largely because nobody turned their mind to a potential 
overlap. For almost eighty years between 1913 and 1990 the system was one of demarcation. After 
1990, this developed into a policy that explicitly tolerated dual protection for two dimensional 
designs but required three dimensional designs being exploited industrially to find their protection in 
design rights. As the ALRC explained, the distinction between two and three dimensional works 
serves a ‘rough justice’ because designs applied to a surface usually fulfil an aesthetic purpose, while 
designs applied as shapes usually served an industrial purpose.191  
Whether the changes in regime have had any effect on design applications and registrations is 
difficult to establish. Certainly, there seems to have been a decline in the number of applications 
around the time that dual protection for two dimensional designs was introduced, but this is from an 
unusual high point in 1987 and correlates to a period of recession in the economy. Numbers still 
remained well above those of earlier decades. A bigger increase in registrations can be seen after 
the introduction of the new Designs Act 2003, which made only minor changes to the overlap 
provisions.192 However, analysis by the Advisory Council on Intellectual Property (ACIP)193 reveals 
that this increase is due to a strong rise in use by foreign companies. Use by Australian companies 
remains largely unchanged while use by Australian individuals has declined steeply.194 
A key challenge over the years has been how to formulate the policy of demarcation in sufficiently 
clear statutory language, and how to deal with works falling on the border between aesthetics and 
industry. It is probably fair to say that efforts have met with only partial success. In 1995, the ALRC 
Report had found that there was ‘an unacceptable degree of confusion surrounding the 
designs/copyright overlap.’195 Since the enactment of the Designs Act 2003, there have been a 
handful of court decisions interpreting the new provisions.  Some of these have clarified the law, 
while others have revealed ongoing complexity and uncertainty.  
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In 2007, the High Court gave some useful guidance on the category of ‘works of artistic 
craftsmanship’ in the decision of Burge v Swarbrick.196 The central issue in this case was whether a 
‘Plug’ for a racing yacht (that is, ‘a hand-crafted full scale model of the hull and deck sections’197 of 
the yacht) was a work of artistic craftsmanship, and thus exempt from the limitation on copyright 
infringement under section 77 of the Copyright Act 1968. The Court concluded that while it might be 
‘impossible, and certainly would be unwise to attempt any exhaustive and fully predictive 
identification of what can and cannot amount to a work of artistic craftsmanship’ the determination 
turns not on assessing beauty, aesthetic appeal or harmony between visual appeal and utility, but 
rather on ‘assessing the extent to which the particular work’s artistic expression, in its form, is 
unconstrained by functional considerations.’198 Based on this approach, the Plug was not a work of 
artistic craftsmanship because matters of visual and aesthetic appeal were subordinated to purely 
functional aspects, and the work of Mr Swarbrick in designing it was not that of an ‘artist-
craftsman’.199 In 2008, the Federal Court confirmed in Digga Australia v Norm Engineering that the 
2003 amendments to section 77 had the effect that the copyright exception would apply to 
functional designs created after that date.200 
Two cases have considered the new definition of ‘corresponding design’ in section 74 of the 
Copyright Act, both of them turning on technical discussions of whether certain treatments of fabric 
can be considered two or three-dimensional. In Polo/Lauren Company L P v Ziliani Holdings Pty 
Ltd,201 the court was called upon to decide whether the embroidered polo player logo on Polo Ralph 
Lauren garments was a ‘corresponding design’ under the Act. The trial judge considered that it was 
because the logo was made up of at least 784 stitches, which altered the fabric and meant it was not 
a ‘mere’ surface design of pattern or ornamentation.202 On appeal, however, the Full Court 
disagreed, appearing to decide (although not altogether clearly) that it would only consider features 
of shape or configuration to be embodied in three dimensions where the product is made in that 
shape or configuration in its entirety. 
The Court did not, however, explicitly consider how one would decide whether something was three 
or two dimensional, and so questions remain as to where the line will be drawn.203 Indeed, the issue 
arose again in the recent case of Seafolly v Fewstone.204 This case involved copying of swimwear and 
the section 77 defence was raised in relation to an artwork depicting a diamond style smocking 
pattern placed onto shirred fabric. The judge, Dodds-Streeton J, noted that the Full Court’s reasoning 
in Polo/Lauren was ‘not consistently explicit, but must be inferred, in some instances, from the 
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materials it cites or extracts.’205 However, despite conceding that some of its statements could be 
read in more than one way, Dodds-Streeton J was able to conclude that the Full Court’s  reasons 
indicated that it is the features of shape or configuration that must be embodied in a product ‘which 
will occur when the product (in the present case a garment) is made in the shape or configuration of 
the artwork.’206  She concluded that in this case the smocking could not be considered three-
dimensional because it was only part of a product not itself made in the shape or configuration of 
the design. She stated that although the fabric was not flat, ‘[a]ny protrusion of the smocking from 
the surface is minimal and probably significantly less than that in Polo/Lauren itself.’207 
 
The plaintiff’s Senorita artwork.208 
 
The defendant’s bandeau-shaped garment.209 
                                                          
205
 Ibid. 153. 
206
 Ibid. 153. 
207
 Ibid. 155. 
208
 © Seafolly Pty Limited. Image reproduced with permission. 
[Type text] 
 
29 
 
 
In 2012, ACIP was asked by the government to review the operation and effectiveness of the Designs 
Act 2003. ACIP delivered its report in March 2015, having carried out surveys, received submissions 
and analysed data from IP Australia. It made a number of recommendations for reform of the 
designs system, ranging from increasing the term of protection to fifteen years, to changing the 
terminology for registered but uncertified designs to make it clear that such designs do not confer 
registrable rights and introducing a grace period.210 It recommended against introducing an 
unregistered design right, on the basis that there was very little support for it.211 
In its consideration of the copyright/design overlap provisions, ACIP observed that the rules 
continued to be ‘contentious and unsatisfactory’.212 Its survey of users of the design system revealed 
that two thirds of respondents admitted to some level of confusion as to whether their designs were 
covered by copyright or designs and similar levels of confusion were displayed in relation to whether 
or not to apply for an innovation patent or a design right.213 ACIP received submissions for the Arts 
Law Centre of Australia, the National Association of Visual Artists (NAVA) and the Australian 
Copyright Council, contending that the provisions operated unfairly in respect of artists as compared 
to all other kinds of copyright owners and proposed reform that would improve the position of 
artists in relation to industrially applied artistic works.214 By contrast, the Law Council of Australia 
suggested removing entirely the distinction between two-dimensional and three-dimensional 
embodiments so that that the provisions would apply to limit copyright irrespective of whether the 
artistic work was exploited in two- or three-dimensional form. The Law Council recognised this 
would reduce the protection of artists but considered removing the uncertainty to be more 
important. It also argued that the exclusion for works of artistic craftsmanship should apply only 
where the final products sold were themselves works of artistic craftsmanship, to reduce arguments 
over prototypes and models for industrial production.215 Another concern raised in the ACIP review 
related to the loss of copyright protection for sculptures where 50 or more are made, on the basis it 
may be in breach of the Berne Convention.216 
A final problem identified by ACIP and earlier by Janice Luck217 relates to ongoing inconsistency 
between section 18 of the Designs Act and section 77 of the Copyright Act. Luck points out that the 
amendments to the definition of ‘corresponding design’ in section 74 of the Copyright Act in 1989 
and in 2003 were intended to exclude artistic works exploited or registered as two-dimensional 
designs applied to the surface of articles from the copyright limitations in sections 75 and 77 of the 
Copyright Act. Section 18 of the Designs Act is intended to allow artistic works to be registered as 
designs, even though they might otherwise not be considered ‘new and distinctive’ by reason of 
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having been used as artistic works (unless that use involved the sale or hire of products to which the 
design had been applied industrially). However, because section 18 refers to an application for a 
corresponding design in relation to that artistic work, and because ‘corresponding design’ is said to 
have the same meaning as in the Copyright Act,218 the owner of the registered design can only rely 
on section 18 where the design consists of visual features of shape and configuration. However, as 
Luck argues, ‘there appears to be no reason why corresponding design for the purposes of designs 
legislation should not have continued to be defined as a design that reproduces an artistic work 
regardless of whether the design consists of two-dimensional features of pattern or ornament or 
three-dimensional figures of shape or configuration.’219 
In its Options Paper, ACIP had canvassed three alternatives to address the ongoing problems in this 
field: (1) clarifying areas of uncertainty in particular the concept of when a design is ‘embodied’, 
especially in cases at the boundary of two and three dimensions, and limiting the exclusion for works 
of artistic craftsmanship to cases where the final marketed product is itself a work of artistic 
craftsmanship; (2) adopting a limited copyright term for industrially applied artistic works, in a 
manner similar to an unregistered design right; and (3) allowing full dual protection of designs and 
copyright works. Its instinct in the Options Paper was to adopt the first option. In relation to the 
third option, full dual protection, ACIP noted it had received no evidence that copyright protection 
was needed to provide sufficient incentives for such designs and that it was reluctant to extend 
copyright to cover mundane items of machinery. Third, it cautioned against using other jurisdictions 
as an example in favour of dual protection as such jurisdictions often applied a higher standard of 
originality to objects of applied art or exclude or give thin protection to functional visual features. 
Given the ease of acquiring copyright protection for artistic works in Australia, ACIP considered that 
‘although there are some suggestions in the copyright cases that protection may be limited where 
the creator’s choices are limited, it would be a bold move to assume that these suggestions will be 
sufficient to ensure that copyright does not entirely take over the field of design and the protection 
of visual features of products.’220  
In its Final Report, however, ACIP had changed its position and now considered that a review of the 
overlap provisions was largely beyond its remit, which was the Designs Act 2003. Its sole 
recommendation was therefore that steps be taken to make section 18 of the Designs Act consistent 
with the overlap provisions of the Copyright Act.221 It seems likely, therefore, that Australia will 
continue to tinker with the provisions regulating the copyright/design interface without any 
dramatic change of policy in the foreseeable future. 
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